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aDepartment of Political and Social Sciences, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy; bSchool of Social
Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
ABSTRACT
Faced with growing policy complexity and environmental uncer-
tainty, policymakers are increasingly concerned with ensuring that
policy processes retain functionality amidst shock and uncertainty.
In this paper, we seek to address the ways in which robustness –
or the capability of policies to maintain functionality and effective-
ness in policy goal attainment – can be designed into policies,
institutions or systems. We suggest that robust policy designs can
be characterized by diversity, modularity and redundancy, whereas
robust policy design processes require the presence of polycentric
decisional process, political capacity and technical capacity. In
identifying these design elements of policy robustness, we argue
that robustness is a property that can be designed to ensure that
policies continue to deliver, over time, its intended functions,







The main aspiration of policy design as well as of policymakers is to be able to
formulate durable solutions for problems perceived as collective. This means that policy
decisions are expected to be capable of persisting over time, in terms of goals pursued
and the capacity to maintain an acceptable level of effectiveness or functionality in the
pursuit of these goals. This requires policy solutions – or the set of policy instruments
adopted to deal with a policy problem through the distribution of costs and benefits,
delivery of services and regulation individual and social behaviours – to be designed in
a way that they can maintain functionality over time. Such functionality is especially
important, in light of an increasingly complex policy environment that is fraught with
‘wicked problems’ and ‘black swans’ (Head, 2008; Ho, 2008; Taleb, 2010; Weber &
Khademian, 2008).
Recent examples of such policy uncertainty include the 2007 Global Financial Crisis,
the 2011 Fukishima nuclear disaster, as well as acts of terrorism and other security
challenges. These instances, along with others, highlight the growing prevalence of
uncertainty as a permanent fixture of policymaking today. To manage such uncertainty,
policymaking needs to be capable of responding to unexpected events and their
impacts, through the activation of different modes/mechanisms (ie learning, adaptation,
CONTACT Giliberto Capano giliberto.capano@unibo.it Department of Political and Social Sciences, Strada
Maggiore 45, 40125 - Bologna, Italy
POLICY AND SOCIETY
2018, VOL. 37, NO. 4, 422–440
https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.2018.1504494
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License (http://creative
commons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly cited.
improvisation) to maintain their commitment and effectiveness in pursuing the
expected policy goals. This capacity of policymaking to respond to, and retain function-
ality amid, uncertainty can be defined as ‘robustness’.
Given the need for functionality amidst an increasingly complex and uncertain
policy environment, there is much need for greater attention to policy robustness,
especially from a policy design perspective. This focus on designing robust policies
presents a highly promising, and fascinating, way of reorienting the attention of policy
scholars to the structural and procedural conditions for ‘good’ policy designs. While we
have provided a systematic overview of policy robustness elsewhere (Capano & Woo,
2017, 2018 ), we will seek to further clarify the concept of robustness in the following
section. This is followed by a discussion of why and how the concept of robustness
should be considered relevant for policy design. Having clarified the conceptual foun-
dations of robustness, we will then present some empirical examples of robustness in
policy design, after which we will focus on how – ie under what conditions – policy
robustness can be designed. In the conclusion, we present some suggestion for further
research.
2. What is robustness
Owing to its wide usage across various disciplines, robustness has been imbued with
multiple meanings. As a concept, robustness is more prevalent in the natural sciences
than in the social sciences. Whether in engineering, biology or ecosystems, robustness has
been associated with a system’s ability to maintain its functions or characteristics in a
relatively controlled and reliable manner in the face of external shocks or perturbations
(Carlson & Doyle, 2002; Jen, 2005). This focus on ensuring functional reliability in the
face of shock carries over into efforts at understanding robustness in public policy,
particularly in terms of environmental policy. For instance, Anderies, Folke, Walker,
and Ostrom (2013) have defined robustness as a ‘reduced sensitivity of outputs to shocks’,
whereby the system continues to function and outputs do not change despite variations in
the inputs. Such systemic stability, however, does not come without a cost, especially in
terms of trade-offs between robustness and performance (Zhou & Doyle, 1997).
It should, however, be noted that robustness in the policy sense does not neces-
sarily give rise to stability or institutional/procedural rigidity. In responding to a
policy shock or uncertainty, it is natural for policymakers to adapt or adjust certain
parameters of their policies, institutions or processes. However, such adjustments do
not detract from the overall policy goal or direction that is emphasized in a given
policy mix. For instance, the Global Financial Crisis gave rise to substantive changes
in the regulatory frameworks of many developed economies, although the emphasis
on systemic stability and financial sector development has not changed. Robustness
therefore emphasizes the ability to maintain the consistent delivery of a desired set of
policy outputs.
It is also important to emphasize that robustness differs from other seemingly similar
concepts, such as ‘resilience’ (Berkes & Folke, 2000; Cote & Nightingale, 2012; Folke
et al., 2010; Lebel et al., 2006; Olsson, Folke, & Berkes, 2004; Timmerman, 1981;
Walker, Holling, Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004), with robustness emphasizing the retention
of functionality amidst shock, whereas resilience focuses on returning to a stable
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equilibrium point after shock; this focus on functionality also means greater manipul-
ability of policy instruments and parameters (Capano & Woo, 2017) .
To reiterate, robustness directly refers to this capacity to deal with external shocks,
conditions of uncertainty or imperfect external conditions in a way through which both
institutional or procedural functions and the capacity of policy initiatives to attain
expected goals are maintained, despite any eventual structural or procedural changes
(Goodin, 1998; Leeson & Subrick, 2006; Ostrom, 1990). The emphasis is not so much on
maintaining institutional form or procedural integrity, but the capacity to maintain public
service delivery as well as to achieve a predetermined set of policy goals and outputs.
Robustness can therefore be thought of in terms of policymakers’ capacity to respond to,
and retain functionality amidst, uncertainty, with such capacity often exercised through the
design of effective policies or institutions. Defined in this way, robustness becomes a
characteristic or competency that allows policymakers to deal with changes and possible
uncertainty without compromising the expected performance and functioning of a specific
policy or set of policies. For instance, an ecosystem’s understanding of robustness focuses on
the capacity to maintain a desired state against fluctuations in the behaviour of either its
parts or its environment, often with changes to its components in order to maintain
functionality; in institutional systems, a constitution can be defined robust if both the
legitimacy and functionality of its political institutions can be maintained during contested
or critical times, albeitwith possible amendments to someof its components (Bednar, 2016).
Robustness can therefore be seen as that property of a policy that allows the specific
functions/goals of a policy – in terms of behaviour to be regulated and values to be
delivered – to be maintained over time despite contingent or critical fluctuations arising
from external changes or internal challenges. In line with this view, a robust policy has
been defined as one that is able to perform or work well across a range of plausible
futures or scenarios (Dryzek, 1983, pp. 369–361; Walker, Rahman, & Cave, 2001,
p. 289). Such robustness also extends to the cognitive limitations of policymakers and
designers themselves. For instance, Dryzek (1983, pp. 360–361) has defined robust
policies as possessing an ‘invulnerability to the weaknesses in our understanding, and
to unexpected changes in the environment of policy’.
It is also important, for clarity’s sake, to emphasize that robustness is not the same
as stability or adaptability. Stability refers to the systemic, institutional or policy
capacity to maintain the actual state (ie the specific characteristics) of a system
(policy, political system, organization or institution), whereas robustness refers to
the capacity to maintain its functions (ie ability to maintain the delivery of a set of
policy outputs). This makes robustness a dynamic property: a robust institution or
policy is not static. Indeed, ensuring policy functionality can also involve adaptations
to policy parameters or institutions. This is evident in the regulatory reforms that
were enacted post-GFC, for the purpose of ensuring financial system stability.
Although parts of the regulatory infrastructure were adapted, neither the policy
goals of stability nor the roles of financial regulators were substantially changed.
Then, ‘robustness is a measure of feature persistence in systems where the perturba-
tions to be considered are not fluctuations in external inputs or internal system
parameters, but instead represent changes in system composition, system topology,
or in the fundamental assumptions regarding the environment in which the system
operates’ (Jen, 2003, p. 13).
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The arguments that are presented above point to the promising possibility that
robustness can be designed and thus become a fundamental element in the actions of
policy designers. We will now address this significance of robustness for policy design.
3. Why robustness is relevant for policy design
The endeavour of policy design involves a deliberate commitment to improving public
policy by anticipating the possible effects of governmental decisions and articulating
specific courses of action towards the effective attainment of expected goals (Dryzek,
1983). In designing policies, decision makers often draw on their existing knowledge,
empirical evidence and external advice to strengthen their ability to design efficient and
effective policies (Bobrow, 2006; Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987; Howlett & Rayner, 2017).
Policy design as a field of scholarly research has faced its ups and downs in the last few
decades, and in the wake of prominent government failures such as the global financial
crisis, it is now experiencing a promising resurgence as governments seek to understand
how to design more effective policies (Howlett, 2011, 2014).
What is particularly relevant in this resurgence of policy design is the specific
attention devoted to the double-sided nature of policy design: the actual process of
‘designing’ policies (where different actors try to influence the final output) and the
specific set of policy instruments or policy ‘designs’ to be adopted (the final content of
the designing process). This distinction between design as process and design as out-
put – that echoes the distinction between design as ‘verb’ and design as ‘noun’ (May,
2003) – allows both policy scholars and practitioners to identify and focus on distinct
dimensions that can be used to better understand and practice policy design.
In terms of the procedural dimension of policy design (the ‘verb’), efforts to under-
stand the processes that determine why and how policy is designed should focus not
only on political-institutional conditions but also on the policy advisory systems and
streams of policy ideas that surround and determine the formulation process. With
respect to the outputs of policy design (the ‘noun’), greater attention should be devoted
to the possible combinations of policy instruments that are at the disposal of policy-
makers and the ways through which policymakers assess the potentiality, in terms of
their effectiveness in attaining policy goals, of the instruments and their various
combinations.
This double-sided nature of policy design is especially relevant in any robustness-
based understandings of policy design, since robustness can be a valuable property both
of design as process and of design as output. Although a robust policy means, on the
surface at least, the capacity of a designed set of policy instruments to deal with a
specific problem despite any possible uncertainty or fluctuation, there can also be a
broader and more systemic understanding of robustness, with a robust design process
having significant impacts on the potential robustness of the design output.
These considerations are necessary premises to underline why robustness is relevant
for policy design and hence a necessary consideration to be included in the theoretical
and prescriptive toolkit of policy designs.
The general landscape within which robustness has emerged as a relevant concept for
policy design is represented by the contemporary complexity of policymaking. Policies
are increasingly contested and ‘wicked’ and policy arenas overcrowded, while the need
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for functional integration among different policy fields as well as the influence of
multilevel dynamics represents continuing sources of challenge and potential instability,
with policymakers possessing minimal capacity for controlling all the relevant factors
that can influence policy dynamics (Head, 2008; Room, 2011; Weber & Khademian,
2008). Such complexity and dynamics, coupled with the limited capacity of policy-
makers, can give rise to high levels of uncertainty.
It is against this structural condition of policy dynamics and complexity that robust-
ness could be considered a possible antidote or strategic tool for good policy design, in
terms of designing policies with the capacity to overcome fluctuations and challenges in
the implementation process and achieving expected policy goals under relative stability. It
is not a case then of growing interest in robustness in several specific policy fields (climate
change, environmental policy and risk management) or among scholars of comparative
politics who are interested in institutional design (Bednar, 2009; Goodin, 1998; Shepsle,
1989). Rather, robustness presents a broader structural framework within which not only
the outputs, but also the processes of policy design are determined. Indeed, one of the
most prominent frameworks of public policy, the Institutional Analysis and Development
framework developed by Elinor Ostrom, devotes much attention to robustness (Janssen,
Anderies, & Ostrom, 2007; Ostrom, 1990).
Given its potential utility to existing understandings of how to make more effective
policies in complex and hard times, robustness therefore presents an interesting and
highly promising concept from a policy design perspective. This is evident in the
increasing empirical interest in robustness in policy design.
4. Empirical cases of robust policy design
Empirical examples of robustness in policymaking tend to be limited by two reasons.
First, understandings of uncertainty tend to differ across political, cultural and ideolo-
gical contexts, making it difficult to operationalize and define robustness for policy
design (Anderies & Janssen, 2013). Second, robustness tends to be conflated or con-
fused with other similar concepts such as resilience or stability. As a consequence,
existing efforts to understand robustness in policy design tend to either be situated
within studies of resilience or lack systematic conceptualization. Hence, while some of
these studies focus on resilience, they at the same time argue for the development of
robust policies (eg see Cavallo & Ireland, 2014).
There is, nonetheless, growing interest in how robustness can be developed in policy
processes. One area in which robustness has received much attention is climate change
and environmental policy, with many of these studies focused on developing strategies
to cope with ecological or environmental instability, often by reducing an ecosystem’s
vulnerability to climate change (Anderies, Rodriguez, Janssen, & Cifdaloz, 2007; Callo-
Concha & Ewert, 2014; Jäger et al., 2015). Such efforts at understanding robustness in
environmental policy also tend to involve developing more effective policies for mana-
ging natural resources such as water, energy and fuel that may be diminished or affected
by the impacts of climate change (Dadson et al., 2016; Gober, Quay, & Larson, 2016;
Hamilton et al., 2013; Koul, Falebita, Akinbami, & Akarakiri, 2016). The concept of
robustness has also been particularly useful for research on energy transitions
(Hamarat, Kwakkel, & Pruyt, 2013; Kwakkel, Eker, & Pruyt, 2016). Similar efforts
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have focused on developing policy robustness in pollution control, particularly in terms
of carbon emissions reduction (Böhringer, Rosendahl, & Storrøsten, 2017; Fischer,
Greaker, & Rosendahl, 2014; Pedroni, Dutschke, Streck, & Porrua, 2009).
Such studies of policy robustness in environmental and climate-change policies have
yielded useful ways of thinking about robust policy processes, such as ‘robust decision
making (RDM)’ approaches that emphasize adaptability in decision making (Bhave,
Conway, Dessai, & Stainforth, 2016; Lempert, Groves, Popper, & Bankes, 2006; Walker,
Haasnoot, & Kwakkel, 2013; Weaver et al., 2013), robustness metrics for assessing policy
adaptability (Kwakkel et al., 2016), ‘precautionary’ policies that provide preventive mea-
sures for addressing potential environmental hazards and risks (Barrieu & Sinclair-
Desgagné, 2006; Iverson & Perrings, 2012) or the use of scenario planning to pre-empt
and prepare for the various potential climate-change scenarios (Chermack, 2004; Groves
& Lempert, 2007; Hamilton et al., 2013; Peterson, Cumming, & Carpenter, 2003).
Another related policy area that has emphasized policy robustness is disaster man-
agement, with studies in this area tending to focus on complex thinking and systems
approaches to managing the complex and interconnected risks associated with natural
disasters (Carlson & Doyle, 2002; Cavallo & Ireland, 2014; Mens, Klijn, de Bruijn, & van
Beek, 2011). Such growing interest in developing robust policies in the areas of
environmental policy and disaster management is driven by the possibility of drawing
on scientific evidence and measures to facilitate evidence-based policymaking (Desouza
& Yuan, 2013). However, growing policy complexity, not simply in the natural envir-
onment but across a broad spectrum of policy areas, has also led to emerging efforts to
understand how robustness can be incorporated into policy systems and processes
across different policy areas.
This is particularly the case in economic policy, where policymakers tend to be
focused on ensuring that economies and their regulatory systems are robust in the face
of economic shocks and crises (Casey, 2015; Claessens, Kose, Laeven, & Valencia, 2014;
Demirgüç-Kunt & Servén, 2010; Levine, 2012). Of particular importance to such
endeavours is the notion of risk. Efforts at developing robust policies and policy systems
that can withstand economic or financial shock and uncertainty have also placed a
strong emphasis on risk management, especially in terms of formulating risk manage-
ment strategies and removing barriers to the implementation of risk management
policies (Hallegatte & Rentschler, 2015).
While economists and central bankers have tended to take a systemic approach to
understanding policy robustness, there is growing emphasis on designing robust poli-
cies that can address market uncertainty (Levine, 1986). This is particularly the case
after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, with such efforts focused on the design of robust
macro-prudential policy tools that can pre-empt or respond effectively to market failure
and externalities (Claessens, 2015; Yellen, 2011). These efforts draw on preexisting
understandings of robustness in monetary policy that emphasize central bankers’ ability
to manage inflation (Levin, Wieland, & Williams, 1998; Levin & Williams, 2003; Taylor,
1999), although monetary policy robustness can also be affected by the sociopolitical
context within which central bankers and policymakers are embedded. For instance, it
has been found that an interest-driven hegemonic paradigm has led European Central
Bank policies that are quite robust in managing inflation but weak in stimulating
economic growth (Kaltenthaler 2006; Laski & Podkaminer, 2012).
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This focus on specific robust policies can also be found in social policy, with robust
welfare policies defined as those that retain their robustness or functionality regardless
of assumptions of policy target or recipient’s behavioural motivations (Grand 1997).
This often involves establishing clear rules of conduct, such as through a citizen’s
charter, which can foster greater transparency and predictability in the delivery of
welfare services (Greener, 2002). Such efforts at understanding robustness in social
policy are therefore focused on managing and addressing uncertainty in human beha-
viour rather than the external environment. Others have noted the usefulness of system
dynamics modelling and simulation for ensuring policy robustness in the face of such
behavioural complexity (Pruyt, 2015).
As this section has shown, there is growing interest in the design of robust policies
across a broad array of policy areas. These range from environmental policy and climate
change to economic governance and social policy. Given space constraints, the list of
empirical studies of policy robustness provided above is far from exhaustive. However,
the presence of such efforts to identify and understand empirical cases of policy
robustness further suggests a need for a more systematic understanding of how robust
policies can be formulated and implemented, ie how policy robustness can be designed
into a given policy system. We will now seek to address this in the next section.
5. How policy robustness can be designed
As we have seen, robust policies can be designed, although our understanding of them
remains far from complete. Efforts to design robustness into policies are particularly
prevalent in the realm of financial sector policy. For instance, inflation targeting policies
allows central bankers to maintain inflation within a predetermined range in response
to shifts in the macroeconomic environment. As another example, policymakers also
rely on what are known as ‘automatic stabilizers’, such as income taxes and welfare
expenditures, that allow a society to adjust its expenditures in response to an economic
downturn. For instance, unemployment and welfare benefits autonomatically accrue to
those who are affected by a recession, whereas progressive taxation ensures that house-
holds pay lower taxes on their income in the event of a fall in household income.
However, such efforts to design robustness into policies and policy processes remain
restricted to the realm of financial sector policy, with applications to other policy
domains limited. To design robust policies, then, is possible but difficult. It involves
the capacity to imagine a plausible solution, based on a coherent causal theory, and then
to proceed to design it in a way that the expected goals can be reached. But designing
robust policies is quite demanding because it asks for robustness not only in the design
output but also in the design process. In fact, the process of design is not simply a
neutral means of achieving a robust design output, but part of a broader robust policy
dynamics.
Designing policy robustness is a complex task whose viability, constraints and
opportunities depend on the characteristics of the issue/policy involved as well as the
sociopolitical and institutional context within which policy design occurs. It is not a
case then that, as we have reported above, robustness is considered a fundamental
component in the design of policies in fields like network infrastructure (like in energy
or in public transport), environmental and climate-change policies, natural sources and
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disaster management, and macroeconomic and monetary policies. Rather, all these
policy fields are characterized by elements that can facilitate a design approach that is
focused on robustness.
First of all, many of these studies remain focused on the design of the output, with
the process of design often neglected or deemed less relevant by scholars. Put in other
words, designing a robust system of water management or of metropolitan transport
network is, notwithstanding the technical complexity of the issues at stake, more simple
and straightforward than designing a robust welfare or education policy. This difference
is due to the nature of the policy to be designed: where the social/value dimension
prevalent or where the role of the human behaviour plays an important role in
determining policy outcomes, it can be much more complex to design robust policies.
From this point of view, robustness, in its full conception, remains under-explored and
under-specified in the existing public policy literature, although there are several
exceptions in welfare policy (Le Grand, 1997) and in gender policy (Galea, Powell,
Loosemore, & Chappell, 2015).
Second, the nature of the issue at stake can determine the reliability of forecasts
about the possible uncertainty that can develop over time. For instance, there are
many formal models that have been developed to assess different possible scenarios
on the basis of specific assumptions (Chermack, 2004; Mietzner & Reger, 2005;
Peterson et al., 2003). These exploratory models can help decision makers system-
atically assess the consequences of an alternative set of decisions (Auping, Pruyt, &
Kwakkel, 2015; Bankes, 1993; Bankes, Walker, & Kwakkel, 2013; Thissen, Kwakkel,
Mens, van der Sluijs, & Stemberger, 2017). Yet at the same time, these highly
sophisticated analytical tools seem to be more applicable to specific policy fields
than others. This is especially the case where the definition of the problem to be
solved is clearly defined and widely agreed upon. We are not saying, then, such
exploratory models of decision making are not useful for designing robust policies
but simply that they could be a useful and supporting tool in specific decisional
contexts.
From our point of view, it is more relevant to focus on and grasp those factors that
are necessary, although not sufficient, conditions to designing robust policies.
Seen from this perspective, then, we shall focus on those conditions that can allow
for both robust design processes and robust design outputs. The linkage between
process and output is relevant for us, since robust design processes can also contribute
to the formulation of robust design outputs. This linkage is based also on existing
empirical evidence that the process of design is neither a linear nor a ‘one shot’ activity;
on the contrary, it is an unfinished ongoing dynamic that can also be reversed over time
and between the different stages of the policy process. For instance, design processes
occur not only in policy formulation, but also during the implementation phase, as
policymakers seeking to achieve a robust design output intervene during the various
stages of the policy process to make the (re)adjustments needed to maintain the
expected functionality of the policy process.
Thus, we can distinguish among the characteristics that allow for the design of
robust policies and the maintenance of policy functionality.
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5.1. Characteristics for robust design outputs
Robust policies are characterized by their capacity to maintain functionality, and thus
effective delivery of their intended objectives, under unexpected circumstances or
conditions of uncertainty. According to Howlett et al. (2017), robust policies should
be capable of dealing with surprise by reacting in an agile and flexible way when
disturbances happen. To be capable of effectively addressing uncertainty and surprise,
robust policies by design possess the following characteristics (Goodin 1998 ; Bednar,




Finally, redundancy means the presence of different institutions and/or organizations in
charge of managing, and deciding on, the same policy issue (Landau, 1969; Perrow,
1999). As Hammon (2007: 417) points out, ‘the errors and failures of organizational
units – which are inevitable – can be corrected, or at least compensated for, by the
existence of one or more of the other organizational units’. Thus, redundancy allows for
a policy’s main functions to work even if some of its parts (institutions, organizations,
policy instruments, etc.) fail to deliver due to some unexpected event or development.
To design redundancy into a policy requires the strategic introduction of duplication
and overlapping functions or properties. For instance, the raising of more ‘pillars’ in
pension policy (Natali, 2008) presents a way of designing and planning redundancy to
ensure pension coverage in the long run. At the same time, the adoption of competi-
tion-driven policies in many policy fields, in the last decades, can be read as a way
through which inter-organizational policy redundancy can be introduced (Miranda &
Lerner, 1995). Finally, the presence of different decision-making centres on the same
domain is fundamental for governing natural resources systems (Low, Ostrom, Simon,
& Wilson, 2003).
Perhaps most importantly, the design of diversity, modularity and redundancy into
policies should be carried out in an integrated and calibrated manner, as an excessive
focus on each characteristic could give rise to policy failure or disruption. For instance,
excessive diversity could result in gridlock, especially if contestations occur between
different decision nodes. Similarly, policy designs that are too modular could result in a
lack of integration in the overall design, with policy outcomes either disrupted or only
partially achieved. Lastly, overly catering for redundancy can be costly, as resources are
unnecessarily devoted to maintaining an excessive level of slack that is rarely, or even
never, utilized. As the saying goes, all things in moderation.
Ensuring the right amount of diversity, modularity and redundancy requires policy
designers to take a ‘bird’s eye’ view in ensuring that policies designed retain a fine
balance of the three characteristics. There is therefore a need for some level of
coordination and general arrangement of these characteristics and the introduction of
hierarchy (or ordered priority of the three characteristics) into the designed output.
However, and as we have discussed above, designing robustness into policy also
depends on a certain level of flexibility, both in policy designs and in the design process
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itself. Such flexibility ensures that policy functions are maintained, or their components
adapted in order to maintain such functionality, in the face of disturbance.
Such flexibility is also possible when policy designers have at their disposal new
ideas, good information, opportunity and motivation for learning as well as functional
substitutes, ie a well-designed mix of policy diversity, modularity and redundancy. In
other words, there is both rigidity and flexibility involved in the design of diversity,
modularity and redundancy into policies – ‘external’ rigidity in terms of the centralized
and hierarchical coordination needed to maintain a suitable mix of the three character-
istics and ‘internal’ flexibility in terms of these three characteristics’ role in ensuring a
policy’s ability to adapt and adjust in order to maintain functionality in uncertainty.
There is therefore a dual aspect of diversity, modularity and redundancy that, when
managed well, gives rise to robust design, but if managed badly, could give rise to
problematic policy designs.
Finally, what emerges from our analysis is that, all in all, robust design should be
based more on procedural instruments than on the substantive ones. From this point of
view, then, the proper mix of diversity, modularity and redundancy can be designed by
establishing borders for actors’ behaviour, assigning roles and establishing specific
procedures for coordinating, evaluating, monitoring and revising the actual design.
5.2. Conditions for robust design process
The production of design outputs capable of guaranteeing robust policy also depends
on the features of the design process, both at the stage of formulation and at the stage of
implementation. This means the policy process should possess certain characteristics
that can allow policymakers and designers to (re)design and revise an existing design,
especially in the face of abrupt shifts and changes, to maintain an expected grade of
policy robustness.
This means that, all in all, robust policy designs are driven by robust design
processes. These processes include the structural and procedural features through
which decision makers design policies. Designing robust policies needs specific attri-
butes to be present in the process of design itself. Unlike robust policy design outputs,
robust design processes require more than the two characteristics discussed above.
While these conditions are by no means exhaustive or definitive, we argue that they
constitute important conditions that, once fulfilled, can contribute immensely to policy
robustness.
At this level of the policy design process, diversity, modularity and redundancy
culminate in the property of ‘polycentricity’. As is well known, polycentricity is a
concept on which a huge literature has developed in the last few decades after the
seminal work of Ostrom, Tiebaut and Warren (1961), who pointed out that ‘polycentric
connotes many centers of decision making which are formally independent of each
other’ (p. 831). Then, polycentricity has become a central concept in the analysis of
common pool resources (Andersson & Ostrom, 2008; Bixler, 2014; Nagendra &
Ostrom, 2014; Ostrom, 1990), in terms of polycentric governance that ‘requires a
complex combination of multiple levels and diverse types of organizations drawn
from the public, private, and voluntary sectors that have overlapping realms of respon-
sibility andfunctional capacities. . . . In addition, private corporations, voluntary
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associations, and community-based organizations play critical supporting roles in a
polycentric system of governance, even if they have not been assigned public roles in an
official manner’ (McGinnis & Ostrom, 2011, p. 15).
Polycentricity in turn refers to the presence, with various and different roles, of a
plurality of actors as well as organizations in the design process. This pluralism, if well
governed, can lead to a favourable configuration of interest, ideas, information and
learning attitudes (Blomquist, 2009) that can in turn give rise to a ‘variance’ of possible
policy responses necessary for ensuring flexibility in the face of unexpected disturbances.
Polycentricity does not mean, obviously, absence either of hierarchy or of strong
coordination, as we know from the huge literature on governance arrangements
(Capano, Howlett, & Ramesh, 2015a, 2015b). Rather, the focus of polycentricity is to
ensure greater capacity, and legitimation, to deal with the multifaceted challenge of
defining problem and solutions (McGinnis, 2000; Ostrom, 2010). Seen from this point
of view, the relevance and strength of polycentricity as condition for robust policy
design encompass as well the adoption of participatory tools; for instance, Michels
(2011) has found that policy instruments that foster citizen participation, such as
referendums, deliberative surveys, participatory policymaking or interactive govern-
ance, and deliberative forums can give rise to more robust policy outcomes and
procedures.
However, a polycentric decisional structure is only one of the conditions needed for
robust design processes.
As we know from a more recent literature on policy design, good design processes
need to be characterized by a significant political capacity as well as by a high level of
technical capacity (Capano, Regini, & Turri, 2016; Howlett, Mukherjee, & Woo, 2015).
Both political and technical capacities are important for designing robust policies. For
instance, political or ‘legitimation’ capacity, or the strength of government in building
up consensus around a specific design, not only is crucial for facilitating timely and
efficient decision making, but also is an important factor in ensuring the presence and
functioning of the polycentric decision processes that are so crucial for robustness
(Woo, Ramesh, & Howlett, 2015).
Technical capacity directly refers to ‘the ability of governments to make intelligent
choices’ (Painter & Pierre, 2005), which implies the ability to set the right strategic
directions (Howlett & Lindquist, 2004), weigh and assess the implications of policy
alternatives (Bakvis, 2000) and base decisions on a dense and appropriate use of
evidence-based policymaking (Parsons, 2004). Technical capacity then directly refers
to a specific set of skills or competencies necessary for the nourishment of analytical
capacity, which relates to the effective assessment and use of policy advice in support of
the decision process (Xun, Howlett, & Ramesh, 2017).
Hence, there is a need to establish the capacities for evaluating and utilizing the
various available informational resources – whether these are data collected by the
government or provided by policy advisory organizations – in support of policy
robustness. It is quite clear that analytical capacity depends on various factors like the
institutional and bureaucratic characteristics of a political system, the features of the
related policy advisory system, the level of openness of the decision-making process to
external interest groups and advocacy coalitions, etc.
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To summarize our argument, robust design process can be developed by establishing
a polycentric decisional structure, ensuring sufficient political capacity to ensure the
legitimacy of the design process as well as the relevant technical capacity necessary for
effective policymaking. The presence of these conditions is necessary for the initial
design as well as for the subsequent stages of the design process when, faced with
evolving policy dynamics and shifting circumstances, the content of a specific policy
could need to be revised and eventually redesigned to maintain expected policy func-
tions and retain its focus on intended goals.
The initial design is fundamental because it, at the very inception of the policy,
imbues it with the necessary attributes of a robust policy design, as discussed above.
The characteristics of a robust policy (diversity, modularity and redundancy) can
subsequently be calibrated through the application of deep analytical capacity and the
garnering of political consensus and legitimacy from its multiple stakeholders. Such
robustness in the design process can therefore ensure that timely and relevant inter-
ventions are formulated and applied to ensure continued policy functionality should
any disturbances emerge to disrupt or challenge existing policy activities.
The three conditions for robust design processes we have just presented, set together,
offer a general framework that needs to be operationalized in order that it can be used
either as an explanatory tool to understand why some design processes are less robust
than others or as a practical applied tool for redesigning the features of actual policy
processes, with the aim of improving their robustness. This will, as we discuss next,
require further research and conceptualization.
5.3. Trade-offs
As the discussion thus far has shown, the merits of designing robustness into policies
are clear. Policymakers are increasingly placing a strong premium on maintaining
policy functionality amidst uncertainty. However, this is not to say that policy robust-
ness is in itself ‘perfect’ or unproblematic. As with many other aspects of policymaking,
there are trade-offs and challenges that may emerge with designing robustness into
policies.
For instance, policies that are robust, and hence able to maintain their functionality
no matter what, can also be detrimental to public sector innovation. Indeed, it has often
been noted that public sector innovation depends as much on environmental and
contextual complexity as well as on ‘bottom-up’ efforts of public managers and citizens,
as it does on top-down policy processes (Hartley, 2005), with ‘policy entrepreneurs’
often excelling by combining the various intertwined components of primordial soup of
policies, problems and solutions within which they are embedded (Kingdon, 1984).
Thus, from this point of view, robust policies can become over-institutionalized and
thus very problematic to be changed. Ironically, by eliminating the ‘negative’ aspects of
uncertainty, robust policies may close off potential opportunities for policy entrepre-
neurs or other stakeholders to rethink or reinvent existing policy processes and
procedures. Although there are important implications of such trade-offs between
robustness and innovation, we also argue that the benefits of ensuring policy function-
ality amidst shock and uncertainty cannot be understated, especially in areas of strategic
importance or in the provision of essential public services. Certainly, efforts to
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understand and possibility address such trade-offs will require further research into
policy robustness. We will now discuss these areas of potential future research.
6. Concluding remarks for further research
In this paper, we have sought to provide the reasoning and conceptual basis for policy
robustness, with the assumption that this concept can be useful for policy design. In
doing so, we argue that robustness is a property that can be designed to ensure that
policies continue to deliver, over time, its intended functions, purposes and objectives,
even under negative circumstances. We have tried to show how robustness applies to
both design processes and design outputs, imbuing both with the capability to react to
shock and uncertainty by maintaining functionality. In other words, robustness can be a
powerful driver of policy effectiveness and functionality over time. As we have dis-
cussed in our introduction, this role of robustness is particularly important in light of
the increasingly complex and unstable policy environment that policymakers are faced
with.
There is therefore much scope for further and deeper research, both theoretical and
empirical, on policy robustness from a policy design perspective.
From the theoretical point of view, there is a need to establish stronger linkages
among the various streams of literature that aim to understand how robust and effective
policies can be formulated and implemented (such as public policy, policy design,
institutional analysis, public management) as well as to better understand how the
different conditions for robust design processes and outputs can be operationalized and
set in different possible configurations. The establishment of such an integrated under-
standing of policy robustness, and the operationalization of its various components and
aspects, can contribute to more accurate applications of policy robustness to empirical
cases.
From the empirical point of view, further research can focus on understanding
whether and how the intrinsic features of different policy fields require specific
configurations of the proposed conditions of robustness that we have discussed in
this paper. In this sense, for example, there is a need to know more about the
different configurations of diversity, modularity and redundancy and of polycentri-
city, political and technical capacity that are required in different policy fields, each
with its unique sociopolitical context. While we have identified these important
determinants of policy robustness, there remains the question of: how much (of
diversity, modularity, redundancy, etc.) is enough. In order to answer this question,
there needs to be more empirical testing of the theoretical concepts that we have
discussed in this paper.
Furthermore, existing understandings of robustness in policy design remain limited
by the completely unexplored issue of the role of agency in robust policies. Should
robust policy design be based on different individual motivational and behavioural
assumptions in different policy fields? How much room of freedom should be left to
policy actors to maintain policy robustness over time? What role can policy entrepre-
neurs play in establishing policy robustness? In short, there is a need to address the role
of specific actors in building policy robustness and how these roles differ in accordance
with the nature and motivations of the actors involved.
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While we have sought in this paper to establish a clearer conceptualization of policy
robustness, more work needs to be carried out in order to make our knowledge of
robustness in policy design more robust.
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